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Chapter 21: The Law of Nature
From time immemorial, many philosophers and poets have held that the sufficient ethical guide for man was to "follow the laws of nature." Taken literally, the advice is unnecessary and absurd. It is impossible to violate the laws of nature; man cannot help obeying them. The definitive word on the theory that man "ought" to follow the laws of nature, or that he should take whatever happens in "nature" as his moral guide, was said by John Stuart Mill in his essay on Nature (written in 1854 but not published until 1874, after his death). The word Nature, Mill points out, has two principal meanings: it either denotes the entire system of things, with the aggregate of all their properties, including the relations of cause and effect, or it denotes things as they would be if there were no human intervention. In the first sense, the doctrine that man ought to follow nature is meaningless. Man has no power to do anything else. All his actions are necessarily in conformity with or "obedience" to one or more of nature's physical or mental laws. The other sense of the term, the doctrine that man ought to follow nature -- i.e., ought to make the spontaneous course of things the model of his own voluntary actions -- Mill held to be not only irrational but immoral. It is irrational because all human action whatever consists in altering the spontaneous course of nature, and all useful action consists in improving it. It is immoral because nature can be wanton, destructive, and cruel:
Nature cannot be a proper model for us to imitate. Either it is right that we should kill because nature kills; torture because nature tortures; ruin and devastate because nature does the like; or we ought not to consider at all what nature does, but what it is good to do. If there is such a thing as a reductio ad absurdum, this surely amounts to one. If it is a sufficient reason for doing one thing, that nature does it, why not another thing? If not all things, why anything? Conformity to nature has no connection whatever with right and wrong. The point is sufficiently made. Perhaps it is over-made, and I need to call attention to some reservations. If we see nature as the source of all evil, we must not overlook that it is also the source of all good. If it wounds and kills us, it also gives us health and life. Nature may someday destroy Man, but it is Nature that has made Man possible. And as Bacon reminded us, "Nature is not governed except by obeying her." We cannot "improve" on nature, we cannot use her to forward our own purposes, unless we study her and learn her laws. We must make use of one or more of her laws to help us to overcome the obstacles presented to our aims by one or more of her other laws. "That art which you say adds to nature, is an art that nature makes.... The art itself is nature." (1) The study of the ways of nature is the first law of intelligence, of prudence, and even of survival. But all this does not mean, as Cicero thought, that "Whatever befalls in the course of nature should be considered good." The identification or confusion of the idea of Nature with the idea of Reason or the idea of Good has, in fact, almost hopelessly confused legal thought for almost twenty centuries. This is illustrated by the history of the doctrine of Jus Naturale, or natural law in the legal sense, which has for the most part been advocated and rejected for the wrong reasons. The concept is right, and indispensable to all legal reform; but the terminology is misleading. The ancient Romans came by both "naturally" enough. All legal rules, they thought, should be reasonable and "natural." The Stoics saw and worshiped the "rule of nature" in the world at large. They were convinced that Reason and Right were the voice of Nature. But what was really meant by the Law of Nature was the Law of Reason or Ideal Law. "The law of nature," as one writer has put it, "is an appeal from Caesar to a better informed Caesar. It is an appeal by society at large, not against single decisions or rules, but against entire systems of positive law." (2) The plea for Natural Law, in brief, is a plea for the purification and reform of positive law, an appeal from positive law to justice, an appeal from reality to ideals, an appeal, so to speak, from the highest existing human court to a still Higher Court. All improvement in positive law depends on the retention of that ideal, as all improvement in positive morality depends on the retention, and the purification and perfection, of our ethical ideals.
1. Shakespeare, A Winter's Tale, Act IV, scene 4, line 90. 2. Paul Vinogradoff, Common-Sense in Law(Home University Library), p. 244. I am not competent to prescribe a satisfactory selective bibliography on the enormous literature, pro and con, on Natural Law. But no reference should omit the classic discussion by Sir Henry Maine in his chapter, "The Modern History of the Law of Nature" in Ancient Law (1861). A selective bibliography (which, surprisingly, omits Maine) can be found in Morris Cohen's Reason and Nature (1931), pp. 401-402. © 1964 Henry Hazlitt. For permissions information, contact The Foundation for Economic Education, 30 South Broadway, Irvington-on-Hudson, NY 10533. Jamie Hazlitt 45 Division St S1 4GE Sheffield, UK +44 114 275 6539 contact@hazlitt.org, / |