Chapter 25: Equality and Inequality

The problem of equality vs. inequality has been touched upon in the preceding chapter on Justice, and will be dealt with again when we come to compare the ethical merits of capitalism and socialism. But it may be instructive to consider it briefly in a chapter by itself.

The problem may be stated thus: Why does "justice" sometimes seem to call for equality of treatment, and sometimes for inequality of treatment? Is this as inconsistent as it seems on its face? Or are we here applying the terms equality and inequality in two different senses -- or in two different frames of reference?

Let us begin with the biological field. It is simply not established, biologically, that "all men are created equal." On the contrary, the preponderant opinion of biologists and biochemists today is that all men are created unequal. All men are born with a unique combination of genes and chromosomes; with different physical potentialities that will lead to different fingerprints, different faces, different heights and bodily structures, different degrees of energy, health, immunity or susceptibility to disease, and longevity; with different intellectual and moral potentialities, gifts and deficiencies. (1)

Differences in environment, nutrition, education, and experience will determine the direction that potentialities take, and may increase or decrease the potential differences that existed at birth. It is the impossibility of scientifically separating or isolating innate from acquired characteristics -- or at least failure to do so up to now -- that has made it impossible to say with confidence which characteristics of an adult are the result of inborn and which of environmental factors, or precisely how much influence to attribute to each. But the dogma of innate equality cannot be established, and the presumption of innate inequality is enormously strong. (2) Even Karl Marx admitted "the inequality of individual endowment and therefore productive capacity" and "unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were not unequal)." (3)

A number of highly important practical consequences follow from this recognition of unequal endowments. One of them is inequality of treatment in many respects. It is not "just," but foolish, to try to give the same education to mentally retarded children and to exceptionally gifted children. We may be wasting our time on the former and failing to develop the potentialities of the latter. We may be hurting both. In that case we are being unjust to both. Similarly, we are wasting time and energy (our own and that of others), as well as being unjust, when, ignoring natural endowments or propensities, we try to force a potential scientist to be an artist or a potential artist to be a scientist.

There is a second corollary which follows from either innate or acquired inequality. If two men have different endowments or different productivity, if one turns out either a greater product or a better product than another, then it is both foolish and unjust to insist that they should be paid the same amount. They should be paid, as the free market tends to pay them, in proportion to their productivity. Justice in this case consists in proportionality rather than equality. To give equal pay for unequal product is not only immediately unjust, but foolish because it deprives both the superior worker and the inferior worker of his incentive to produce more or better. It is therefore in the long run unjust to both, and unjust to society. (4)

So much for the necessity, and the appropriate sphere, of inequality of treatment. We come now to the necessity, and the appropriate sphere, of equality of treatment, or at least of consideration. All men are not born biologically equal, but in a just society they are born, or should be born, equal in rights. To say this is to say that all men are, or should be, equal before the law. And to say this, in turn, is to say that the law should be general in application, and should never allow arbitrary exceptions.

That in a theater fire I (whoever I am) should be allowed to be the first to get to the exit; that in a sea disaster I should be in the first lifeboat; that at a street crossing I should be allowed right of way regardless of lights or rules; that at a buffet dinner I should always be the first to help myself -- this is what the moral rule of equality cannot permit. The common interests requires that order and precedence in these matters must be governed by general rules applied to and enforced on everyone. We cannot allow exceptions. Or rather, whatever exceptions are permitted (e.g., in traffic, to fire engines, ambulances, police cars) must be exceptions made by rule in the general interest, not merely in the special interest of the persons excepted. If everybody were to treat himself as an exception there would be a mad rush for the fire exits, a furious scramble for the lifeboats, a traffic jam and constant accidents, a disorderly, ill-mannered, and degrading rush to the buffet table, which would make things worse for everybody.

Equality in this sense means the refusal to allow exceptions, or to allow exceptions for any other than the general interest, and never merely for the interest of the exception himself. Equality in this sense means not only the rule of justice; it means the rule of law and order. It is merely another way of insisting on the strict adherence to general rules. The exceptions must be permitted only for reasons relevant to this purpose, and never for irrelevant reasons either of social rank or individual superiority.

In other words, to say that we should be subject to general laws is to say that these laws should apply equally to everybody. "Equality before the law" can perhaps be a misleading phrase. It is the laws that are equal in application. There is no implication that the persons subject to the law are equal in any other respect than their right to equality of treatment in the application of the law. There is no implication in this that "all men are born equal." This dubious premise is not needed to establish the utility and justice of equal treatment by the law.

Equality before the law might be stated in still another way. It is symbolized in the statues which show Justice blindfolded, holding a pair of scales. This does not mean that Justice is blind to everything else but the merits of the case. It means that everything else is to be ignored but compliance or noncompliance with a general abstract law, or abstract considerations of equity in a particular case. It means that race, color, religion, and all other qualities or differences in status or wealth or ability of the litigants are to be dismissed as irrelevant. Such differences are never to be recognized or seen by Justice.

In brief, there is no inconsistency in pointing out that justice sometimes demands Equality and sometime Inequality, provided we keep clearly in mind in what respect treatment, consideration, or reward should be equal or unequal. Everything depends upon the frame of reference.

Notes

1. The literature on this is of course enormous. The interested reader may consult, for example, Free and Unequal, by Roger J. Williams, director of the Biochemical Institute of the University of Texas (University of Texas Press, 1953).

2. See Roger J. Williams, op. cit.

3. Critique of the Social Democratic Program of Gotha. (Letter to Bracke, May 5, 1875.)

4. This will be developed further in the chapters on the ethics of capitalism and of socialism.

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